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Abstract
We consider an abstraction of computational security in password protected systems where a user
draws a secret string of given length with i.i.d. characters from a finite alphabet, and an adversary would
like to identify the secret string by querying, or guessing, the identity of the string. The concept of
a “total entropy budget” on the chosen word by the user is natural, otherwise the chosen password
would have arbitrary length and complexity. One intuitively expects that a password chosen from the
uniform distribution is more secure. This is not the case, however, if we are considering only the average
guesswork of the adversary when the user is subject to a total entropy budget. The optimality of the
uniform distribution for the user’s secret string holds when we have also a budget on the guessing
adversary. We suppose that the user is subject to a “total entropy budget” for choosing the secret string,
whereas the computational capability of the adversary is determined by his “total guesswork budget.”
We study the regime where the adversary’s chances are exponentially small in guessing the secret string
chosen subject to a total entropy budget. We introduce a certain notion of uniformity and show that
a more uniform source will provide better protection against the adversary in terms of his chances of
success in guessing the secret string. In contrast, the average number of queries that it takes the adversary
to identify the secret string is smaller for the more uniform secret string subject to the same total entropy
budget.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of identifying the realization of a discrete random variable X by repeatedly
asking questions of the form: “Is x the identity of X?”. This problem has been extensively studied by
cryptanalysts who try to identify a secret key by exhaustively trying out all possible keys, where it
is usually assumed that the secret key is drawn uniformly at random. We consider an n-tuple Xn :=
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2X1, . . . , Xn drawn from an i.i.d. source, µθ(·) on a finite alphabet X , where θ represents the corresponding
categorical distribution, which is not necessarily uniform. We measure security against a brute-force
attacker who knows the source statistics completely, and who would query all the secret strings one by
one until he is successful.
Denoting the number of guesses by Gnθ (X
n), the optimal strategy of the attacker that minimizes the
expected number of queries E[Gnθ (Xn)] is to guess the possible realizations of Xn in order of decreasing
probability under µnθ (·). Massey [1] proved that the Shannon entropy of Xn, H(Xn), is a lower bound
on the rate of growth of the expected guesswork, yet there is no upper bound on E[Gnθ (Xn)] in terms
of H(Xn). Arıkan [2] proved that when we consider a string of growing length whose characters are
drawn i.i.d, the positive moments of guesswork associated with the optimal strategy grow exponentially,
and the exponents are related to the Re´nyi entropies of the single letter distribution:1
lim
n→∞
1
n
logEθ [(Gnθ (Xn))
ρ] = H1/(1+ρ) (X) , (1)
where the Re´nyi entropy of order ρ is
Hρ(X) =
1
1− ρ log
(∑
x∈X
P (X = x)ρ
)
. (2)
Note that limρ→0Hρ(X) = H(X) recovers the Shannon entropy. We also use the notations Hρ(θ) and
Hρ(X) interchangeably to refer to the Re´nyi entropy of a string drawn from a source with parameter
vector θ. Although these connections have been extended to more general stochastic processes [3], [4],
in this paper, we focus on i.i.d. processes for the sake of clarity of presentation.
Christiansen and Duffy [5] showed that the sequence {n−1 logGnθ (Xn)} satisfies a Large Deviations
Principle (LDP) and characterized its rate function, Λ∗θ. Beirami et al. [6], [7] showed that Λ
∗
θ can be
expressed as a parametric function of the value of a “tilt” in a family of tilted distributions.
We remark that when the metric of difficulty is the growth rate in the expected number of guesses as
a function of string length, the challenge for the adversary remains the same even if the adversary does
not know the source statistics [8], [9].
In this paper, we first show a counter intuitive result that the average guesswork increases when the
source becomes “less uniform” if the user is subject to a total entropy budget on the secret string. Next,
we introduce a natural notion of total guesswork budget on the attacker and show that the probability
of success of an adversary subject to a total guesswork budget increases when the source becomes “less
uniform,” which is consistent with our intuition of choosing uniform passwords. We will formalize these
notions in the rest of this paper.
1In this paper, log(·) denotes the natural logarithm.
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3II. PROBLEM SETUP
Given a finite alphabet X , a memoryless (i.i.d) source on X is defined by the set of probabilities θi =
P [X = xi] for all i ∈ [|X |], where [n] := {1, . . . , n} and
∑
i∈[|X |] θi = 1. Hence, θ is an element of the
(|X |−1)-dimensional probability simplex. We define Θ|X | as the open set of all probability vectors θ such
that θi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |X |}, which also excludes the uniform source u|X | = (1/|X |, . . . , 1/|X |).
The tilt operation plays a central role in the analysis, and is the basis for many of our derivations:
Definition 1 (tilted θ of order α [6]). For any α ∈ R, define τ(θ, α) as the “tilted θ of order α”, where
τ(θ, α) = (τ1(θ, α), . . . , τ|X |(θ, α)), where τi : Θ|X | × R→ Θ|X | for all i ∈ [|X |] is given by
τi(θ, α) :=
θαi∑|X |
ı=1 θ
α
i
. (3)
Definition 2 (tilted family of θ). Let Γ+θ ∈ Θ|X | denote the “tilted family of θ” and be given by
Γ+θ := {τ(θ, α) : α ∈ R>0}. (4)
Observe that Γ+θ ∈ Θ|X | is a continuum of stochastic vectors in the probability simplex. Thus, the
tilted family of a memoryless string-source with parameter vector θ is comprised of a set of memoryless
string-sources whose parameter vectors belong to the tilted family of the vector θ, i.e., Γ+θ .
Definition 3 (high-entropy/low-entropy members of tilted family of θ). Let Γ+θ and Γ
+
θ denote the sets
of high-entropy and low-entropy members of the tilted family of θ, respectively, and be given by:
Γ
+
θ = {τ(θ, α)}0≤α<1 , Γ+θ = {τ(θ, α)}α>1 . (5)
Hence, Γ+θ = Γ
+
θ ∪ Γ+θ ∪ θ.
Figure 1 depicts the probability simplex of all possible ternary parameter vectors, |X | = 3. The yellow
star represents the distribution θ = (0.1, 0.2, 0.7). Note that the tilted family of θ is parametrized by α.
At α = 0, we get the uniform distribution τ(θ, 0) = u3 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and as α → ∞, we get to
the degenerate case of (0, 0, 1). The high-entropy and low-entropy members of the tilted family of θ are
represented by blue and red, respectively. Note that all distributions in the high-entropy set, Γ+θ , have
Shannon entropies higher than that of θ and are closer to the uniform distribution in the KL divergence
sense [7]. Hence, the higher entropy members of the tilted family are “more uniform” than the lower
entropy members of the tilted family.
Definition 4 (entropy budget per source character). Let h ∈ (0, log |X |] denote the entropy budget per
source character such that the user is required to choose a secret string from an i.i.d. process with
parameter vector θ with H(θ) = h.
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Figure 1: The probability simplex for a ternary alphabet. The figure represents the tilted family of
θ = (0.1, 0.2, 0.7), as well as the high-entropy and low-entropy members of the family.
The concept of a total entropy budget on the entire secret string is a natural one or the user would
choose an arbitrarily complex secret string. We use the entropy budget per source character defined above
to ensure that the user is subject to the same total entropy budget by adjusting the length of the secret
string for a fair comparison between string sources that have different entropy rates.
III. POSITIVE MOMENTS OF GUESSWORK
We first consider choosing strings with the same total (Shannon) entropy budget and measure security
in terms of the positive moments of guesswork. If two sources have different entropy rates, we adjust
the comparison by drawing a longer string from the lower entropy source. Formally, let us consider two
sources with parameter vectors θ1 and θ2 on alphabet X . Further, let H(θ1) and H(θ2) be the entropy
rates of the two sources. Let the entropy ratio be
η :=
H(θ2)
H(θ1)
. (6)
Without loss of generality, throughout this paper we assume that H(θ2) < H(θ1), and hence 0 < η < 1.
The user is given the option to choose a secret string from either of the two sources. For a fair comparison,
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5we assume that the entropy of the two strings is the same, n1H(θ1) = n2H(θ2). That is
n2 =
1
η
n1. (7)
To compare the growth rates of the positive moments of guesswork, in light of (1), we compare H1/(1+ρ)(θ1)
and 1ηH1/(1+ρ)(θ2). This will in turn impose the same total entropy budget on the strings drawn from
the sources with parameter vectors θ1 and θ2.
For a parameter vector θ, let an information random variable be defined as one that it takes the value
log 1θi with probability θi for all i ∈ [|X |]. We need one more definition before we can state the result
of this section:
Definition 5 (skewentropy condition (SEC)). A source with parameter vector θ ∈ Θ|X | is said to satisfy
the skewentropy condition (SEC) if
V (θ)2 + 2H(θ)V (θ)−H(θ)S(θ) > 0, (8)
where V (θ) is the varentropy defined as the variance of an information random variable corresponding
to θ:
V (θ) :=
∑
i∈[|X |]
θi
(
log
1
θi
−H(θ)
)2
. (9)
and S(θ) is the skewentropy, which is the skewness of an information random variable corresponding to
θ:
S(θ) :=
∑
i∈[|X |]
θi
(
log
1
θi
−H(θ)
)3
. (10)
Note that varentropy has been studied extensively and naturally arises in the finite block length
information theory [10], [11], and more recently in the study of polar codes [12]. To the best of our
knowledge, skewentropy has not been studied before, and we provide some properties of the SEC in
Section V.
Equipped with this definition, we provide an ordering of the sources that belong to the same tilted
family.
Theorem 1. Let θ1 ∈ Θ|X |. For any θ2 ∈ Γ+θ1 ,
H1/(1+ρ)(θ1) <
1
η
H1/(1+ρ)(θ2) ∀ρ > 0, (11)
if and only if θ1 satisfies the SEC in Definition 5. Note that η is the entropy ratio defined in (6).
The proof is provided in the appendix. Theorem 1 provides a natural ordering of sources that belong
to the same tilted family. The “less uniform” low per-character entropy members of the tilted family take
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6exponentially more number of queries, on the average, to breach compared to their more uniform higher
per character entropy counterparts.
Corollary 2. Let u|X | denote the uniform source. Then for any θ ∈ Θ|X |, and any ρ > 0,
log |X | = H1/(1+ρ)
(
u|X |
)
<
1
η
H1/(1+ρ)(θ),
where η = H(θ)/ log |X |.
Corollary 2 suggests that, of all sources whose parameter vectors are in the (interior of the) probability
simplex, the uniform source is the easiest to breach in terms of the positive moments of guesswork when
the user is subject to a total entropy budget. This is in contrast to our intuition that more uniformity
provides better security.
IV. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS SUBJECT TO A GUESSWORK BUDGET
In this section, we put forth a natural notion of total guesswork budget, leading to a security metric
consistent with our intuition. Similar to the case of an entropy budget, we need to define guesswork
budget per source character for our analysis.
Definition 6 (guesswork budget per source character). Let g ∈ (0, log |X |] denote the guesswork budget
per source character, such that egn is the total number of queries that the inquisitor can make in order
to identify a secret string of length n.
Note that by this definition, the inquisitor is supposed to possess the resources for querying an
exponentially growing number of strings (with the sequence length). In particular, g = log |X | corresponds
to an adversary who is capable of querying all of the possible |X |n outcomes of the source to successfully
identify the secret string with probability 1.
Lemma 1. If g < H(θ), then
lim
n→∞Pθ[Gθ(X
n) ≤ egn] = 0,
and if g > H(θ), then
lim
n→∞Pθ[Gθ(X
n) ≤ egn] = 1.
Recall that Arıkan [2] showed that the growth rate of the moments of guesswork is governed by
atypical sequences resulting in the appearance of the Re´nyi entropies in the expression. On the other
hand, Lemma 1 states that the cutoff for the adversary to be successful with high probability is still
governed by the Shannon entropy (as intuitively expected).
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7In the regime where g < H(θ), we would like to study the behavior of correct guessing. The next
lemma relates the exponent of an exponentially large number of possible guesses to the LDP rate function.
Lemma 2. If g < H(θ), then
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
1
Pθ[Gθ(Xn) ≤ egn] = Λ
∗
θ(g). (12)
Hence, Pθ[Gθ(Xn) ≤ egn] ≈ e−nΛ∗θ(g), and a larger Λ∗θ(g) directly implies a more secure source
against a brute-force attacker who is subject to a guesswork budget g for a fixed n. We use the above
rate function as the metric for comparing two string-sources given a total guesswork budget, naturally
defined as g × n.
Using the notion of the tilt, we can represent the rate function Λ∗θ(g) as a parametric function of α
for a family of tilted distributions. The rate function, Λ∗θ(g), associated with θ ∈ Θ|X | can be directly
computed as [7]:
Λ∗θ(g) = D (τ(θ, α(g))‖θ) , (13)
for α(g) = argα∈R+ {H(τ(θ, α)) = g}. This characterization plays a central role in our derivations.
Recall that we adjust the string lengths in order to make sure that the secret string chosen by the
user is subject to a given total entropy budget. As the idea of the total guesswork budget is that the
adversary can make a fixed number of queries regardless of the source from which the user is choosing
the password, we compare the sources in terms of the probability of success subject to an adjusted
guesswork budget per source character (see (12)). To keep the total guessing budget of the adversary the
same, i.e., en1g1 = en2g2 , we must adjust the guesswork budget per source character as follows:
g2 = ηg1. (14)
In light of (14), we compare Λ∗θ1(g1) with
1
ηΛ
∗
θ2
(g2) =
1
ηΛ
∗
θ2
(ηg1) for sources with parameter vectors θ1
and θ2.
We are now ready to provide our results on the adversary’s probability of success.
Theorem 3. Let θ1 ∈ Θ|X |. For any θ2 ∈ Γ+θ1 ,
Λ∗θ1 (g1) >
1
η
Λ∗θ2 (g2) , ∀g1 < H(θ1), (15)
if and only if θ1 satisfies the SEC (see Definition 5).
We remark that the same SEC appears to be the crucial quantity for the statement of Theorem 3 to
hold. This theorem implies that when the adversary is subject to a guesswork budget g1 (i.e., he can only
submit en1g1 queries to identify a secret string of length n) for some g1 ∈ (0, H(θ1)), then the chances of
December 27, 2017 DRAFT
8correctly identifying the random string produced by a “more uniform” high per-character entropy member
of the tilted family is exponentially smaller than that of the less uniform low per-character entropy source
belonging to the same tilted family so long as the source satisfies the SEC when the user is subject to the
same total entropy budget and the adversary is subject to the same total guesswork budget. In particular,
the uniform source is the most secure against such an adversary subject to a guesswork budget:
Corollary 4. Let u|X | denote the uniform information source. Then, for any θ ∈ Θ|X | and g < log |X |,
we have
log |X | − g = Λ∗u|X| (g) >
1
η
Λ∗θ(ηg), (16)
where η = H(θ)/ log |X |.
We remark that these security guarantees are against an adversary that is not powerful enough to be
able to explore the entire typical set rendering his chances of success exponentially small. The “more
uniform” sources provide an exponentially smaller chance to such an adversary to be successful.
We emphasize that the implications of Theorems 1 and 3 are in stark contrast to each other. On
the one hand, more uniformity results in an exponential decrease in the number of queries expected
of an adversary to correctly identify a secret string when the user is subject to a total entropy budget
(Theorem 1). On the other hand, more uniformity decreases the chances of an adversary in identifying
the secret string when the adversary’s power is limited by a total guesswork budget as well (Theorem 3).
V. PROPERTIES OF THE SEC
Noting that SEC introduced in Definition 5 is a new concept, we study this condition in more detail
in this section. Let us start with the binary memoryless sources.
Lemma 3. Let θ ∈ Θ2. Further, let φ = min{θ1, θ2} < 12 . Then,
H(θ) = φ log
(
1
φ
)
+ (1− φ) log
(
1
1− φ
)
, (17)
V (θ) = φ(1− φ) log2
(
1− φ
φ
)
, (18)
S(θ) = φ(1− φ)(1− 2φ) log3
(
1− φ
φ
)
. (19)
The next theorem is our main result for binary memoryless sources:
Theorem 5. Any θ ∈ Θ2 satisfies the SEC.
While Theorem 5 shows that all binary memoryless sources satisfy the SEC, the same argument does
not extend to larger alphabets.
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Figure 2: Depiction of the probability simplex for a ternary alphabet. The figure represents the set of
distributions that do not satisfy the SEC.
Theorem 6. For any |X | > 2, there exists θ ∈ Θ|X |, such that θ does not satisfy the SEC.
Despite the negative result in Theorem 6, we show that sources that are approximately uniform satisfy
the SEC for any alphabet size. Here is the key result for such sources:
Theorem 7. Suppose that θ ∈ Θ|X | is such that∣∣∣∣log 1θi −H(θ)
∣∣∣∣ < 2, ∀i ∈ [|X |]. (20)
Then θ satisfies the SEC.
As a corollary, we state the condition more explicitly in terms of θi’s.
Corollary 8. Suppose that θ ∈ Θ|X | is such that
e−1
|X | < θi <
e
|X | , ∀i ∈ [|X |]. (21)
Then, θ satisfies the SEC.
Figure 2 depicts the set of ternary distributions that do not satisfy the SEC. As can be seen, source
close to uniform satisfy the SEC while sources that are close to uniform on a two-dimensional alphabet
while almost missing the third character in the alphabet do not satisfy the SEC.
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VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we provide some numerical experiments. We compare several binary sources, where
θ = (θ1, θ2) is the source parameter vector. The parameter vectors used for the experiments are listed
in Table I. The length and the parameter vector are chosen such that nH(θ) = 9 log 2 nats for all of
the pairs. Although the theorems proved in this paper are of asymptotic nature, we have chosen to run
experiments on finite-length sequences instead to emphasize the applicability of the results even in very
short lengths. As can be seen in Fig. 3, as the entropy rate of the source decreases, the moments of
guesswork increase exponentially subject to the same entropy budget. On the other hand, as shown in
Fig. 4, as the entropy rate of the source decreases, the chances of an adversary subject to a fixed total
guesswork budget increases, which is consistent with our intuition.
θ1 n
0.5000 9
0.3160 10
0.2145 12
0.1461 15
0.1100 18
0.0820 22
Table I: The list of source parameters and sequence lengths of binary sources used in the experiments.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied guesswork subject to a total entropy budget. We showed that the conclusions
about security deduced from the analysis of the average guesswork could be counter-intuitive in that
they suggest that the uniform source is not the strongest source against brute-force attacks. To remedy
the problem, we introduced the concept of total guesswork budget, and showed that if the adversary is
subject to a total guesswork budget, the uniform source provides the strongest security guarantees against
the brute-force attacker, which is consistent with our intuition.
APPENDIX
PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1: This is equivalent to showing that for all ρ > 0,
H1/(1+ρ)(θ2)
H(θ2)
>
H1/(1+ρ)(θ1)
H(θ1)
(22)
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θ1 = 0.5000,    n = 9
θ1 = 0.3160,    n = 10
θ1 = 0.2145,    n = 12
θ1 = 0.1461,    n = 15
θ1 = 0.1100,    n = 18
θ1 = 0.0820,    n = 22
Figure 3: The positive moments of guesswork for sources subject to the same total entropy budget in
Table I.
Figure 4: The probability of success as a function of the total guesswork budget for binary sources of
Table I subject to the same total entropy budget.
for all θ2 ∈ Γ+θ . Let β := 1/(1 + ρ), and hence β < 1. The statement above is in turn equivalent to
showing:
∂
∂α
[
Hβ(τ(θ1, α))
H(τ(θ1, α))
]
α=1
> 0, ∀β < 1. (23)
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It is straightforward to show that (76) is equivalent to
∂
∂α [Hβ(τ(θ1, α))]α=1
Hβ(θ1)
>
∂
∂α [H(τ(θ1, α))]α=1
H(θ1)
, ∀β < 1. (24)
Finally, we prove the following statement that is equivalent to (24):
∂
∂β
[
∂
∂α [Hβ(τ(θ1, α))]α=1
Hβ(θ1)
]
β=1
< 0. (25)
This is equivalent to showing:
∂2
∂α∂β
[Hβ(τ(θ1, α))]α=β=1 H(θ1)
<
∂
∂β
[Hβ(θ1)]β=1
∂
∂α
[H(τ(θ1, α))]α=1 . (26)
The above statement is shown to hold if and only if θ1 satisfies the SEC (Definition 5) invoking
Lemmas 4, 5, and 6, which completes the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 4. For all θ ∈ Θ|X |, we have
∂
∂α
[H(τ(θ, α))]α=1 = −V (θ). (27)
See [7] for the proof.
Lemma 5. For all θ ∈ Θ|X |, we have
∂
∂β
[Hβ(θ)]β=1 = −
1
2
V (θ). (28)
See [7] for the proof.
Lemma 6. For all θ ∈ Θ|X |, we have
∂2
∂α∂β
[Hβ(τ(θ, α))]α=β=1 = −V (θ) +
1
2
S(θ). (29)
Proof: It is proved in [7] that
∂
∂α
[Hβ(τ(θ, α))]α=1 =
β
1− β (H(θ)−H(τ(θ, β)||θ)) . (30)
Hence, we differentiate with respect to β to get:
∂2
∂α∂β
[Hβ(τ(θ, α))]α=1 =
1
(1− β)2 (H(θ)−H(τ(θ, β)||θ))
+
β
1− βV (τ(θ, β)||θ).
December 27, 2017 DRAFT
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Next, we take the limit as β → 1, and by applying L’Hospital’s rule we arrive at:
∂2
∂α∂β
[Hβ(τ(θ, α))]α=β=1 = −V (θ)−
1
2
∂
∂β
[V (τ(θ, β)||θ)]β=1. (31)
Finally, the proof is completed by invoking Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. For any θ ∈ Θ|X |,
∂
∂α
[V (τ(θ, α)||θ)]α=1 = −S(θ),
where S(θ) is defined in (10).
Proof: By definition
∂
∂α
V (τ(θ, α)||θ)
∣∣∣∣
α=1
=
∑
i∈[|X |]
∂
∂α
τi(θ, α)
∣∣∣∣
α=1
(
H(τ(θ, α)||θ)− log 1
θi
)2
=
∑
i∈[|X |]
θi
(
H(τ(θ, α)||θ)− log 1
θi
)3
(32)
= −S(θ), (33)
where (32) follows by invoking Lemma 8 of [7].
Proof of Theorem 3: Let us recall that θ2 = τ(θ1, α) for some α > 1. We can find t1 and t2 in the
domain of each rate function such that the derivatives of the rate function are both equal to a constant
ρ > −1. It follows from [2] that:
t1 = argt
{
∂
∂t
Λ∗θ1(t) = ρ
}
⇒ t1 = H(τ(θ1, β)),
t2 = argt
{
1
η
∂
∂t
Λ∗θ2 (ηt) = ρ
}
⇒ t2 = 1
η
H(τ(θ2, β)), (34)
where β = 1/(1 + ρ). We focus on ρ < 0, and hence β ∈ (1,∞). Note that β = 1, (equivalently ρ = 0)
corresponds to the coinciding zeros of both rate functions. Once again recalling that the rate functions
are convex, proving (1/η)Λ∗θ2(ηt) > Λ
∗
θ1
(t) is equivalent to showing that t2 < t1 (as defined in (34)) for
all β > 1. This is in turn equivalent to showing:
H(τ(θ2, β))
H(θ2)
<
H(τ(θ1, β))
H(θ1)
, ∀α, β > 1. (35)
This is equivalent to:
∂
∂α
[
H(τ(θ1, αβ))
H(τ(θ1, α))
]
α=1
< 0, ∀β > 1. (36)
It is straightforward to show that (36) is equivalent to
∂
∂α [H(τ(θ1, αβ))]α=1
H(τ(θ1, β))
>
∂
∂α [H(τ(θ1, α))]α=1
H(θ1)
, ∀β > 1. (37)
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Finally, we prove the following statement that is equivalent to (37):
∂
∂β
[
∂
∂α [H(τ(θ1, αβ))]α=1
H(τ(θ1, β))
]
β=1
< 0. (38)
This is equivalent to showing:
∂2
∂α∂β
[H(τ(θ1, αβ))]α=β=1 H(θ1)
<
∂
∂β
[H(τ(θ1, β))]β=1
∂
∂α
[H(τ(θ1, α))]α=1 . (39)
The above statement is shown to hold if and only if θ1 satisfies the SEC (Definition 5) invoking Lemmas 4
and 8, which completes the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 8. For all θ ∈ Θ|X |, we have
∂2
∂α∂β
[H(τ(θ, αβ))]α=β=1 = −2V (θ) + S(θ). (40)
Proof: Noting that τ(θ, αβ) = τ(τ(θ, β), α) and invoking Lemma 4, we have
∂
∂α
[H(τ(θ, αβ))]α=1 = −V (τ(θ, β)) (41)
= −β2V (τ(θ, β)||θ), (42)
where (42) follows from Lemma 5 of [7]. Hence, by differentiating the above with respect to β at β = 1
and invoking Lemma 7, we arrive at the claim.
Proof of Theorem 5: The theorem is proved by invoking Lemmas 9 and 10, as follows:
H(θ)S(θ) < V 2(θ) + φ2(1− φ)(1− 2φ) log3
(
1− φ
φ
)
(43)
< V 2(θ) + V (θ)H(θ) (44)
< V 2(θ) + 2V (θ)H(θ), (45)
and hence θ satisfies the SEC.
Lemma 9. For any θ ∈ Θ2, we have
H(θ)S(θ) < V 2(θ) + φ2(1− φ)(1− 2φ) log3
(
1− φ
φ
)
, (46)
where φ := min{θ1, θ2}.
Proof: Let φ = min{θ1, θ2}. First note that by Lemma 11, we have
H(θ) < φ log
1
φ
+ φ. (47)
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Hence,
H(θ)S(θ) < φ2(1− φ)(1− 2φ) log3
(
1− φ
φ
)
+ φ2(1− φ)(1− 2φ) log3
(
1− φ
θ
)
log
(
1
φ
)
(48)
< φ2(1− φ)(1− 2φ) log3
(
1− φ
φ
)
+ φ2(1− φ)2 log4
(
1− φ
φ
)
, (49)
where (49) follows from Lemma 12, completing the proof.
Lemma 10. For any θ ∈ Θ2, we have
H(θ)V (θ) > φ2(1− φ)(1− 2φ) log3
(
1− φ
φ
)
, (50)
where φ := min{θ1, θ2}.
Proof: For φ = min{θ1, θ2}, note that
H(θ) > φ log
1
φ
, (51)
and hence
H(θ)V (θ) > φ2(1− φ) log2
(
1− φ
φ
)
log
(
1
φ
)
(52)
> φ2(1− φ)(1− 2φ) log3
(
1− φ
φ
)
, (53)
where (53) follows from Lemma 12, completing the proof.
Lemma 11. For any 0 < x < 1, we have
(1− x) log 1
1− x < x. (54)
Proof: Note that as x→ 0 both sides are equal and the limit of their derivatives are equal as well,
while the second derivative of the left hand side is equal to − 11−x < 0 completing the proof.
Lemma 12. For any 0 < x < 12 , we have
(1− 2x) log 1
x
< (1− x) log 1− x
x
. (55)
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 11.
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Proof of Theorem 6: We proceed with the proof by construction. Let θ be such that
θi =
 (1− )/(|X | − 1) 1 ≤ i ≤ |X | − 1 i = |X | . (56)
Then, invoking Lemma 13, we can see that as → 0, for sufficiently small  and |X | > 2, we have
1
2
log(|X | − 1) <H(θ) < 2 log(|X | − 1), (57)
1
2

(
log
1

)2
<V (θ) < 
(
log
1

)2
, (58)
1
2

(
log
1

)3
<S(θ) < 
(
log
1

)3
. (59)
Hence,
S(θ)H(θ) >
1
4

(
log
1

)3
log(|X | − 1) (60)
> 2
(
log
1

)4
+ 4
(
log
1

)2
log(|X | − 1) (61)
> V 2(θ) + 2H(θ)V (θ). (62)
where (61) holds for sufficiently small  as long as |X | > 2. Thus, θ does not satisfy the SEC, and the
proof is complete.
Lemma 13. Let θ ∈ Θ|X | be such that
θi =
 (1− )/(|X | − 1) 1 ≤ i ≤ |X | − 1 i = |X | . (63)
Then,
H(θ) = (1− ) log(|X | − 1) + h(), (64)
V (θ) = (1− )
(
log
(
1− 

)
− log(|X | − 1)
)2
, (65)
S(θ) = (1− )(1− 2)
(
log
(
1− 

)
− log(|X | − 1)
)3
, (66)
where h() is the binary entropy function given by
h() := H(, 1− ) =  log 1

+ (1− ) log 1
1−  . (67)
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Proof: The calculation of H(θ) is straightforward by noting that this is a mixture of two uniform
sources on alphabets of size (|X | − 1) and 1. To calculate V (θ), we have
V (θ) = (1− )
(
log
|X | − 1
1−  − (1− ) log(|X | − 1)− h()
)2
+ 
(
log
1

− (1− ) log(|X | − 1)− h()
)2
(68)
= (1− )
(
 log(|X | − 1) +  log 
1− 
)2
+ 
(
−(1− ) log(|X | − 1) + (1− ) log 1− 

)2
(69)
= (1− )
(
log
1− 

− log(|X | − 1)
)2
. (70)
Finally, to calculate S(θ), similarly to the calculations for V (θ), we get
S(θ) = (1− )
(
 log(|X | − 1) +  log 
1− 
)3
+ 
(
−(1− ) log(|X | − 1) + (1− ) log 1− 

)3
(71)
= (1− )(1− 2)
(
log
1− 

− log(|X | − 1)
)3
, (72)
establishing the claim.
Proof of Theorem 7: Let X be drawn from θ. Further, let
Y = log
1
P (X)
−H(X).
Hence, by definition, E[Y 3] = S(θ) and E[Y 2] = V (θ). Then, the condition in (20) would ensure
that Y ∈ [−2, 2]. Noting that the uniform distribution is excluded in Θ|X |, and hence the varentropy is
nonzero, we apply Lemma 14 (with a = 2) to obtain that
S(θ) < 2V (θ).
This is a sufficient condition for the SEC to hold, completing the proof.
Lemma 14. Let Y be a random variable supported on [−a, a] for some a > 0 Further, let E[Y ] = 0 and
E[Y 2] > 0. Then,
E[Y 3]
E[Y 2]
≤ a. (73)
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Proof: It is straightforward to show that E[Y
3]
E[Y 2] is maximized if
py(y) =

ρ/2, y = −a
1− ρ, y = 0
ρ/2, y = a
,
for some ρ > 0, which in turn leads to E[Y
3]
E[Y 2] = a.
Proof of Corollary 8: First we show that the condition in (21) leads to the condition in (20), which
follows from the following set of inequalities:
max
i∈[|X |]
∣∣∣∣log 1θi −H(θ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxi∈[|X |]
∣∣∣∣log 1θi − log |X |
∣∣∣∣
+ |log |X | −H(θ)| (74)
≤ 2 max
i∈[|X |]
∣∣∣∣log 1θi − log |X |
∣∣∣∣ (75)
= 2, (76)
where (74) follows Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of the | · | operator, and (76) is a direct result
of (21). Hence, the claim of Lemma 7 holds, which results in the claim of the theorem.
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